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Condensed Abstract 
Medical devices increasingly depend on software.  While this expands the ability of devices 
to perform key therapeutic and diagnostic functions, reliance on software inevitably causes 
exposure to hazards of security vulnerabilities. This article uses a recent high-profile case example to 
outline a proactive approach to security awareness that incorporates a scientific, risk-based analysis 
of security concerns that supports ongoing discussions with patients about their medical devices. 
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Background 
Although widespread computerization of medical care enables new innovations and 
improves patient outcomes, the healthcare industry struggles with cybersecurity.  With volumes of 
patient data and increasing dependence on software for lifesaving therapies, providers worry that 
security gaps could interrupt care, allow for identity theft, or harm patients. These concerns are 
particularly stark for the medical device industry. Responses to cybersecurity challenges in the last 
decade have been inconsistent, with some progressive manufacturers developing in-house security 
programs before problems occur, while others are less proactive about potential security 
vulnerabilities in their products. 
Clinicians and patients remain relatively uninformed about the methods for evaluating 
security risks, and thus vulnerable to misinformation. Interpreting the results of security research 
can be challenging for physicians and providers, leaving several questions unanswered:  Should 
security vulnerability reports influence prescribing practices or otherwise affect patient care?  What 
evidentiary standards are appropriate?  How do vulnerabilities relate to attacks and patient safety, 
and how should the likelihood of real compromise be estimated?  What is an appropriate response 
to patients who ask about security vulnerabilities they have seen in the news?  This article uses a 
recently reported case of a potential security vulnerability to: (1) provide an overview of 
cybersecurity research methods as applied to medical devices; and (2) demonstrate these methods 
as applied to a specific suspected security threat. 
 
St. Jude Medical and Muddy Waters: Background 
Unlike the medical device industry, no single regulatory body oversees software 
cybersecurity as a whole, and problem reports often originate with independent researchers. The 
accepted best practice among security researchers is “coordinated disclosure,” wherein a researcher 
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notifies a software maker and confirms a remediation in advance of public announcements. These 
reports are similar to “safety communications” issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
but without specific regulatory oversight. 
Occasionally researchers sidestep coordinated disclosure. In August 2016, a hybrid market 
research–vulnerability report written by a hedge fund in concert with a team of security researchers 
alleged vulnerabilities in St. Jude Medical Merlin™ compatible cardiac implantable electronic devices 
(CIEDs) and the ecosystem of devices supporting those CIEDs.(1)  Regulators, the manufacturer, 
providers, investors, and other security researchers scrambled to respond. 
According to the report, security researchers at a company called MedSec studied St. Jude 
Medical’s Merlin product line and found several ways in which they believed the products were 
vulnerable to malicious intrusions. Instead of first contacting the manufacturer, they chose to 
provide their findings to a hedge fund, Muddy Waters LLC, which publicly announced that it held a 
short position on St. Jude Medical’s stock — a wager that the stock would decline in value. The 
report stated that the security researchers would share in profits from the short sale. 
The hedge fund’s report alleged two types of attacks: (1) a “crash” attack purportedly 
causing the CIED to “stop working,” and (2) a “battery drain” attack that could reduce the CIED’s 
time until replacement. The report asserted that the attacks could be “executed on a very large 
scale” and “highly likely could be exploited for numerous other types of attacks,” further claiming 
that “the product safety issues *...+ offer unnecessary health risks and should receive serious notice 
among hospitals, physicians and cardiac patients.(1)  A physician’s open letter on University of 
Chicago stationery at the end of the report stated that he had stopped implanting the affected 
devices and had recommended patients disconnect their Merlin@home units despite consensus 
guidance from the Heart Rhythm Society on benefits to patients from remote monitoring (2); 
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elsewhere, the report acknowledged that the doctor was a board member of the security 
researchers’ firm.(1) 
In reference to the “crash” attack, the report described a loss of radio connectivity with the 
CIED after sending it undisclosed radio traffic.  A companion video showed a failed attempt of an 
operator to program the CIED after sending it the undisclosed radio traffic for several hours.(3) The 
report also referred to “rapid pacing” correlated with a “crash” attack and presented a screenshot 
showing a Merlin programmer display as evidence of malfunction.   
St. Jude Medical responded by disputing the specific vulnerabilities and the impact of 
vulnerabilities that might be found.  The FDA issued a safety communication in January 2017 that 
outlined the clinical concerns.(4)  Importantly, this communication emphasized that there were no 
reported patient harms identified, and characterized the potential vulnerability and the software 
patch developed and validated by St. Jude Medical.(5)  Notably, the communication as well as the 
manufacturer’s own guidance recommend keeping patients’ remote monitoring systems active to 
allow for software updates and patches – guidance that contrasts starkly with the physician letter 
included in the initial security report. 
The FDA’s involvement deepened after its January 2017 safety communication.  An April 
2017 warning letter from the FDA to Abbott, which had recently completed an acquisition of St. Jude 
Medical, stated that St. Jude Medical had “failed to accurately incorporate the findings of a third-
party assessment” of cybersecurity risk from 2014 – which the Muddy Waters report also stated – 
and that St. Jude Medical had failed to follow its own Corrective and Preventive Action (CAPA) 
process when responding to the Muddy Waters report.(6) 
 
Standards of Evidence in Security Research 
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How should this security report be viewed by the clinical community?  The currency of 
security research outside healthcare is the proof of concept, usually executable program code 
embodying an exploit that takes advantage of a vulnerability in a reproducible way.  Unlike medical 
research, nearly all security research concerns human-made systems that perform deterministically 
and identically across every running instance, i.e. a proof of concept will either work or it will not.  
Security researchers often have access to the source code of the systems they study, leading to high-
confidence determinations and claims.  For this reason, security researchers do not typically conduct 
randomized trials or even re-run experiments once a proof of concept is developed. 
In the case of the August/September Muddy Waters report and videos, in our opinion, the 
descriptions and demonstrations not only omitted a proof of concept, but they also left room for 
crucial questions, chiefly: did the purported vulnerabilities affect the essential clinical performance 
of the CIEDs in question? (The report makes a case for omitting a working proof of concept, since it 
claims that doing so would risk patient harm, but it also makes speculative claims about the impact 
of the vulnerabilities, as mentioned above.)  Essential clinical performance refers to the main 
criterion that the FDA uses to determine the safety impact of a problem report. The shorter question 
is: were the CIEDs still able to provide their intended therapies during the purported failures? 
It is unrealistic to expect generalist security experts to know the intricacies of medical 
devices. While investigating a potential vulnerability in a medical device, a security researcher should 
consider collaborating with at least one of three parties: a physician who knows the device well, a 
regulator, or the manufacturer.  If asked to participate in such a study, any of these parties including 
the physician should expect to help nonmedical researchers understand how the device is typically 
used and how to test its essential clinical performance.   
In the case of the Muddy Waters report, the CIEDs’ essential clinical performance would 
have been straightforward to test with knowledge of where to find test-rig schematics; Figure 1 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
6 
 
below shows a standard test rig.  In the absence of this structured approach, in our opinion, it is 
difficult to evaluate the accuracy of the findings of the Muddy Waters report.   
 
“Crash Attack” Outcome: Experimental Model 
Using the general framework outlined above, we sought to replicate, as faithfully as 
possible, the CIEDs’ purported failure modes to understand the likely causes in the wider context of 
essential clinical performance.  Our experiments differ from the experiments described in the Muddy 
Waters report in two important ways.  First, we focused on the “crash attack” to the exclusion of the 
“battery drain attack.”  Previous publications articulated and tested the risks of adversarial battery 
drain in a different manufacturer’s CIED.(7, 8) Second, instead of replicating the attack scenario, we 
sought to replicate the report’s results with legitimate (i.e., non-adversarial) traffic under a null 
hypothesis that the purported error conditions were not due to malfunction.  Thus, we attempted to 
reproduce the report’s “crash attack” outcome—an apparent loss of the ability to communicate with 
the pacemaker—while testing the pacemaker’s therapeutic functions.  
 
We used a St. Jude Merlin programmer version 3650, a new St. Jude Medical Fortify Assura 
VR implantable cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD) and a new St. Jude Medical Assurity SR 1240 
pacemaker furnished on request from St. Jude Medical.  We connected pace/sense leads to a 
custom-made measurement rig according to FDA guidance.(9) To generate radio traffic, we 
conducted routine interrogations with the unmodified programmer.  We monitored the CIED’s 
communication bands using a software radio tuned to the 402–405 MHz MICS band.(10) 
 
The experimental setup, also depicted in Figure 1, was as follows: 
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● Configure the CIED to pace at 60 bpm and the mode to VVI and confirm that it inhibits 
pacing in response to a standard simulated cardiac signal.(11) 
● Simulate cardiac tissue with a 500Ω resistor per FDA guidance.(9) 
● Connect a signal generator (BK Precision 4063) to the sensing input and provide a simulated 
cardiac signal. Signal characteristics: onset with a linear rise of 2ms followed by a linear fade 
of 13ms; period of 800ms and peak amplitude of 5mV. 
● Connect an oscilloscope to the pacing output via a standard 10MΩ probe and set its display 
to 900mV/div and 500ms/div (time domain); confirm that, in the absence of a simulated 
cardiac signal; the pacemaker emits 60 bpm pacing pulses. 
 
Assurity SR Pacemaker 
A video released along with the Muddy Waters report claimed a “crash” condition in which 
an Assurity SR pacemaker was no longer available for telemetry or interrogation after a certain 
duration of undisclosed radio traffic.  We successfully replicated these “crash” conditions against an 
Assurity SR pacemaker — but without affecting its essential clinical performance. 
First, the report and video claimed that radio telemetry — the mechanism by which the CIED 
can communicate with a bedside monitor for active monitoring of the patient — became unavailable 
after an undisclosed amount of radio traffic.  We posited that a sufficient amount of clinically 
uninteresting interrogation radio traffic would trigger a battery-saving mechanism in the CIED.  We 
initiated a series of twelve radio telemetry connections at regular intervals over a two-hour period.  
After sending this clinically unusual amount of innocuous traffic, we confirmed via wand 
interrogation (which uses an inductive near-field channel) that the pacemaker had stopped sending 
radio telemetry. 
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Second, the video suggested that the pacemaker had stopped working altogether because 
the researchers were unable to interrogate it using the programmer wand when the pacemaker was 
directly atop the programmer.  We placed the Assurity SR pacemaker in the same position on the 
programmer as depicted in the video (on the surface of the open programmer, near the handle) and 
confirmed that the programmer failed to establish communication for wand interrogation over 
several attempts.  Moving the pacemaker to a different location (a wooden table next to the 
programmer) allowed normal wand interrogation to be reestablished. 
However, during and after both of these purported “crash” conditions in our experiments, 
we confirmed with the test circuit that the pacemaker correctly emitted pacing pulses at the 
programmed setting of 60 bpm and correctly inhibited pacing in response to the test cardiac signal. 
Thus, while telemetry could be inhibited, there was no apparent impact on the essential pacing 
function of the device. 
 
Fortify Assura VR ICD 
The report offers a screenshot of a programmer showing alerts as evidence of an “apparent 
malfunction” of an Assura ICD they had subjected to a “crash attack.”  To reproduce the same 
condition without causing a malfunction, we connected the ICD’s ventricular port to a set of resistors 
following standard practice for testing CIED connections(11), and left the ICD undisturbed for 
roughly three hours.  The “red error messages” (“VS2” markers) in the programmer’s screenshot 
indicated that the ICD sensed ventricular beats, a normal response to electrical noise according to 
the Merlin PCS help manual.  The programmer raised three alerts, as in the screenshot, related to 
the disconnected lead. The screen displayed an average ventricular rhythm of 162 bpm when the 
lead was disconnected, suggesting that the screenshot evidence provided by Muddy Waters was not 
specific to any particular abnormality or device malfunction. 
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Summary of Experimental Model 
With knowledge of clinical testing practices, it was relatively straightforward for us to 
overcome the experimental shortcomings of the Muddy Waters report, but such knowledge is likely 
out of scope for most non-specialist security researchers.  The key lesson for providers and 
practitioners reading medical-device security research is that it should be approached in the context 
of essential clinical performance.  Speculative claims offered without basic testing of therapeutic 
functions should be evaluated after the establishment of a clinical baseline.  More generally, 
providers and patients should be aware that there are in fact established standards both for 
rigorously evaluating and reporting security concerns in medical devices — and we found no 
evidence that the short sellers followed FDA guidance on reporting cybersecurity problems, which 
are reiterated clearly in the relevant safety communication.(4) 
St. Jude Medical sued the hedge fund, the security researchers, and the collaborating 
physician named in the report.  In the intervening months, the hedge fund and researchers released 
follow-up videos purportedly demonstrating more vulnerabilities, as well as a website and a report 
by independent experts offering further analysis of the Merlin products.(12)  These follow-up 
materials met a higher evidentiary standard, with clearer demonstration of experimental methods, 
but they focused on other vulnerabilities and did not directly support the claims made in the original 
report (e.g., analysis of the “crash attack” was inconclusive). 
 
What Should Physicians Tell Patients? 
Patients are right to wonder about the security of computing devices in or on their bodies, 
especially when they depend on those devices for lifesaving therapies. They are also right to wonder 
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whether devices on their home networks, such as home telemetry receivers, introduce security or 
privacy risks. 
The correct answer to these questions is that, like any therapeutic product, no software or 
hardware medical device is entirely without risk, but clinically proven therapeutic benefits should be 
weighed more heavily than clinically unproven security hazards when deciding whether to 
recommend a therapeutic or diagnostic device.(4) The short answer for patients is that they are 
almost certainly better off with their therapeutic devices than without them.  More generally, FDA 
approval indicates that the manufacturer has provided reasonable assurance of safety and 
effectiveness, meaning the therapeutic benefits and potential harms have been evaluated 
thoroughly in the context of the device type and intended indications.  However, while medical 
device software is reviewed to ensure that it is developed and validated using the appropriate 
practices, FDA review is not an exhaustive, line-by-line examination, and security threats often 
remain theoretical.  Medical device engineering involves consideration and testing of the vast 
majority of relevant failure modes, especially those related to essential clinical performance.  The 
industry trend is toward better cybersecurity, with new publications such as the FDA’s postmarket 
cybersecurity guidance(13) and AAMI’s Technical Information Report 57 recommending specific 
actions manufacturers can take to improve product security.  We are not aware of any reported 
incidents of targeted medical-device hacks causing patient harm.  A prior study evaluating public 
FDA databases of adverse events and recalls noted that while computing and software capabilities 
were common among affected devices, specific security and privacy risks were not identified.(14)    
However, the security hazards to medical devices should not be ignored, and legacy systems relying 
on passive adverse event collection may not be well suited to identifying security risks.(14)  Thus, 
individual security reports must be carefully validated to determine clinical impact. It behooves 
physicians to stay abreast of software-related safety communications along with all other FDA 
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communications, but overreacting to medical device security claims unvetted by FDA or recognized 
experts should be discouraged.  Individual vulnerabilities, if important enough to warrant extra 
scrutiny by the FDA, may trigger further FDA communications in the normal channels. 
 
Conclusion 
Security vulnerabilities appear in nearly every software system, including medical devices. 
When claims of security problems arise, physicians should focus on clinical impacts and demand a 
coherent standard of evidence. A recent report that, in our opinion, fails to use traditional scientific 
standards of evidence for security research serves as a cautionary tale for providers, physicians, 
patients, manufacturers, and security researchers. In particular, security reports on medical devices 
should take steps to rule out null hypotheses that may represent more plausible alternative causes 
(e.g., experimental error, electromagnetic interference, ungrounded leads, RF telemetry lockout). As 
always, alarmism must be tempered by rigor. An elevated temperature could indicate a serious 
infection, or it could simply indicate that a patient ingested hot coffee. Selecting appropriate null 
hypotheses for medical device security requires specialized skills and training. The danger of 
misinterpreting a spurious correlation is that patients may make life decisions that lead to greater 
risks. Providers can best defend against security incidents, even those that have not yet occurred, by 
adopting industry standards for cybersecurity and ensuring that procurement practices treat these 
standards’ prescriptions as requirements. Because future medical device security problems could 
lead to harm and too many reports based on incomplete analysis could foster complacency among 
providers and manufacturers, we recommend scientific rigor as the best defense to promote 
cybersecurity as a public good in the best interest of patients. All medical devices need better 
cybersecurity. However, the key message for providers and patients is that patients prescribed a 
medical device are far safer with the device than without.  
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Figure Legends: 
 
Figure.  St Jude Assurity pacemaker pacing and measurement setup.  
We simulate cardiac tissue with a 500 Ω resistor across electrodes with a lead in the ventricular IS-1 
port, and a 1K Ω resistor from the can to the outer electrode. The oscilloscope (V) measures the 
voltage between the two electrodes of the lead. One probe from the signal generator is connected 
to a 4.5K Ω resistor for a 1/10 voltage divider across the electrodes, and the other directly to the ring 
(anode) of the lead. 
 
